Right to jury trial criminal cases amendment

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury for criminal defendants charged with non-petty offenses.1 Footnote
Southern Union Co. v. United States , 567 U.S. 343, 350–51 (2012) ; see Amdt6.4.3.3 Petty Offense Doctrine and Maximum Sentences Over Six Months. Article III of the Constitution also provides for jury trials in criminal cases.2 Footnote
Art. III, § 2; see ArtIII.S2.C3.1 Jury Trials. As such, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Constitution protects the accused’s right to trial by jury twice,3 Footnote
Ramos v. Louisiana , No. 18-5924, slip op. at 4 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2020) (explaining that the Constitution guarantees criminal jury trials “twice—not only in the Sixth Amendment, but also in Article III” ) (emphasis in original); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) ( “When this Court deals with the content of this [criminal jury trial] guarantee—the only one to appear in both the body of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights—it is operating upon the spinal column of American democracy.” ). although the Court has grounded its analysis of the right primarily in the Sixth Amendment.4 Footnote
See, e.g., Ramos , slip op. at 4, 7 (noting that both the Sixth Amendment and Article III provide for jury trials in criminal cases, but proceeding to analyze only the Sixth Amendment in holding that the right to a jury trial requires a unanimous verdict in both state and federal court); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (noting the Article III provision but grounding the analysis of whether the jury trial right applies in state court in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; “we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal court—would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee” ); cf. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) (reasoning that the Sixth Amendment and Article III jury trial provisions “mean substantially the same thing” and the Sixth Amendment “fairly may be regarded as reflecting the meaning of” the Article III provision).

By virtue of its incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury applies in both federal and state court.5 Footnote
Ramos , slip op. at 7 . But the Supreme Court has yet to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Sixth Amendment vicinage requirement—i.e., the requirement that the jury be “of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law.” See Stevenson v. Lewis , 384 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004) ; Amdt6.4.7 Notice of Accusation. A criminal defendant may, however, waive the right and agree to a trial before a judge alone.6 Footnote
Patton , 281 U.S. at 312 . A valid waiver requires the “express and intelligent consent” of the defendant,7 Footnote
Id. at 312–13 ; see also Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann , 317 U.S. 269, 278 (1942) ( “There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent an accused from choosing to have his fate tried before a judge without a jury even though, in deciding what is best for himself, he follows the guidance of his own wisdom and not that of a lawyer.” ). along with the consent of the court and the prosecution.8 Footnote
Patton , 281 U.S. at 312 ; Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34 (1965) (holding that the waiver of a jury trial in a criminal case “can be conditioned upon the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the trial judge” ); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a) (requiring government consent and court approval). In a similar vein, a defendant may plead guilty in lieu of trial.9 Footnote
See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) ( “Whatever might be the situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important components of this country’s criminal justice system. Properly administered, they can benefit all concerned.” ). A valid guilty plea requires knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to trial by jury,10 Footnote
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) ( “[T]he [guilty] plea . . . is the defendant’s consent that judgment of conviction may be entered without a trial—a waiver of his right to trial before a jury or a judge. Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” ). among other constitutional rights.11 Footnote
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (explaining that a defendant who pleads guilty “forgoes not only a fair trial, but also other accompanying constitutional guarantees” and citing precedent for the proposition that these guarantees include “the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Sixth Amendment right to confront one’s accusers, and the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury” ). Guilty pleas and plea bargaining practices also implicate other questions of constitutional law. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye , 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012) ( “[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.” ); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358 (1978) (considering “whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a state prosecutor carries out a threat made during plea negotiations to reindict the accused on more serious charges if he does not plead guilty to the offense with which he was originally charged,” and holding that no due process violation occurred).

Footnotes 1 Southern Union Co. v. United States , 567 U.S. 343, 350–51 (2012) ; see Amdt6.4.3.3 Petty Offense Doctrine and Maximum Sentences Over Six Months. 2 Art. III, § 2; see ArtIII.S2.C3.1 Jury Trials. 3 Ramos v. Louisiana , No. 18-5924, slip op. at 4 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2020) (explaining that the Constitution guarantees criminal jury trials “twice—not only in the Sixth Amendment, but also in Article III” ) (emphasis in original); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) ( “When this Court deals with the content of this [criminal jury trial] guarantee—the only one to appear in both the body of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights—it is operating upon the spinal column of American democracy.” ). 4 See, e.g., Ramos , slip op. at 4, 7 (noting that both the Sixth Amendment and Article III provide for jury trials in criminal cases, but proceeding to analyze only the Sixth Amendment in holding that the right to a jury trial requires a unanimous verdict in both state and federal court); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (noting the Article III provision but grounding the analysis of whether the jury trial right applies in state court in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; “we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal court—would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee” ); cf. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) (reasoning that the Sixth Amendment and Article III jury trial provisions “mean substantially the same thing” and the Sixth Amendment “fairly may be regarded as reflecting the meaning of” the Article III provision). 5 Ramos , slip op. at 7 . But the Supreme Court has yet to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Sixth Amendment vicinage requirement—i.e., the requirement that the jury be “of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law.” See Stevenson v. Lewis , 384 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004) ; Amdt6.4.7 Notice of Accusation. 6 Patton , 281 U.S. at 312 . 7 Id. at 312–13 ; see also Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann , 317 U.S. 269, 278 (1942) ( “There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent an accused from choosing to have his fate tried before a judge without a jury even though, in deciding what is best for himself, he follows the guidance of his own wisdom and not that of a lawyer.” ). 8 Patton , 281 U.S. at 312 ; Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34 (1965) (holding that the waiver of a jury trial in a criminal case “can be conditioned upon the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the trial judge” ); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a) (requiring government consent and court approval). 9 See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) ( “Whatever might be the situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important components of this country’s criminal justice system. Properly administered, they can benefit all concerned.” ). 10 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) ( “[T]he [guilty] plea . . . is the defendant’s consent that judgment of conviction may be entered without a trial—a waiver of his right to trial before a jury or a judge. Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” ). 11 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (explaining that a defendant who pleads guilty “forgoes not only a fair trial, but also other accompanying constitutional guarantees” and citing precedent for the proposition that these guarantees include “the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Sixth Amendment right to confront one’s accusers, and the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury” ). Guilty pleas and plea bargaining practices also implicate other questions of constitutional law. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye , 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012) ( “[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.” ); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358 (1978) (considering “whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a state prosecutor carries out a threat made during plea negotiations to reindict the accused on more serious charges if he does not plead guilty to the offense with which he was originally charged,” and holding that no due process violation occurred).